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Earnings Volatility and 
the Reasons for Leaving 
the Food Stamp Program
David C. Ribar
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Marilyn Edelhoch
South Carolina Department of Social Services
The primary goal of the Food Stamp Program is to improve the 
well-being of low-income households by increasing their food purchas-
ing power and helping them obtain more nutritious diets than they could 
otherwise afford. To maximize well-being, program administrators 
want benefi ts to reach as many poor households as possible. Through 
means testing, the program also acts to stabilize consumption and pro-
vide a degree of social insurance. Beyond these assistance objectives, 
the Food Stamp Program also has other goals. As a publicly fi nanced 
program, it must be a good steward of taxpayer dollars and maintain 
program integrity by ensuring that benefi ts are directed toward truly 
needy households. More recently, the Food Stamp Program has also 
sought to promote economic self-suffi ciency. 
In some cases, these goals confl ict with each other. For instance, 
it is well-known that the benefi t formula, which reduces a household’s 
allotment of food stamps as its income rises, creates work disincen-
tives that undermine the self-suffi ciency goal. Less understood is how 
administrative procedures, intended mostly to help maintain program 
integrity, affect household well-being and self-suffi ciency.
The federal and state governments are partners in the Food Stamp 
Program, with the federal government setting general rules for the pro-
gram and paying the entire cost of benefi ts and the states administering 
the program. In their role as administrators, states have considerable 
latitude in a number of areas, including establishing and running food 
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stamp offi ces, developing and reviewing initial applications, and set-
ting recertifi cation intervals. This latitude increased with the passage 
of the 2002 Farm Bill. States may also obtain waivers from the federal 
government to alter other features of their programs.
Researchers have only recently begun to quantify the impacts of 
these policies and procedures. For example, Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu 
(2006a,b) found that exits from the Food Stamp Program in South 
Carolina occur mainly at recertifi cation periods and that more fre-
quent recertifi cations hasten exits and decrease the caseload. Staveley, 
Stevens, and Wilde (2002) uncovered similar patterns in administra-
tive data from Maryland, and Currie and Grogger (2001), Kabbani and 
Wilde (2003), Kornfi eld (2002), and Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold 
(2007) have documented negative associations between recertifi cation 
frequency and food stamp caseloads. While this research has identi-
fi ed general impacts associated with policies and procedures, it has not 
yet explained why certain effects appear. With respect to recertifi cation 
frequency, shorter intervals could increase the detection of ineligible 
households, deter ineligible households from continuing their participa-
tion, or discourage eligible households by increasing the costs of pro-
gram compliance.
In this chapter, we use administrative records from South Carolina 
on over 30,000 food stamp spells for cases with children that began 
between the second half of 1997 and the beginning of 2005. We use 
descriptive and multivariate event-history methods to look generally at 
the characteristics of households that contribute to exits from the Food 
Stamp Program and more specifi cally at the reasons why households 
leave the program. A focus of our investigation is on how earnings his-
tories and especially previous earnings volatility are associated with 
different types of exits. The data from South Carolina are very helpful 
in this regard.
First, South Carolina’s administrative records are extremely rich 
and detailed. The records not only contain the start and stop dates of 
Food Stamp Program participation—information needed to construct 
spells—but also contain demographic information about the participat-
ing households and the specifi c reason why each household stopped 
receiving benefi ts. The records are also linked to quarterly earnings re-
cords from the state’s Unemployment Insurance (UI) system, allowing 
us to construct earnings histories.
up08djivafch4.indd   64 10/8/2008   10:27:59 AM
Reasons for Leaving the Food Stamp Program   65
Second, some of South Carolina’s food stamp policies are particu-
larly easy to measure. This paper concentrates on the state’s recerti-
fi cation policies, which are directly relevant to the issue of earnings 
volatility because they expressly condition on it. The policies changed 
over the period that we study. Prior to October 2002, the state required 
most households with earnings and other fl uctuating sources of income 
to recertify quarterly and most other households with stable unearned 
incomes to recertify annually. In October 2002, the state lengthened the 
recertifi cation interval for households with fl uctuating incomes from 
three to six months. Because the recertifi cation dates are set relative to 
the beginning of a spell, they can be distinguished from regular calendar 
effects. The changes in policy over time provide an additional source of 
longitudinal variation, and the differences in their applicability across 
groups provide additional cross-sectional variation. 
The centrality of the recertifi cation process is confi rmed when we 
analyze the reasons why participation spells end. These analyses reveal 
that half of the food stamp households in South Carolina with children 
that leave the program do so by letting their certifi cation periods lapse 
and not fi ling the necessary paperwork for recertifi cation. Households 
with earnings at the start of their certifi cation periods are especially 
likely to leave for this reason. A further sixth of caseload exits occur be-
cause people either fail to provide suffi cient information or they give in-
formation that cannot be verifi ed. Just over a fi fth of exits occur because 
people either report or are discovered to have incomes or resources that 
are too high. For white households, more variable earnings histories 
are negatively associated with exits for income ineligibility. For both 
black and white households, more variable earnings histories increase 
the odds of leaving voluntarily or for other reasons.
THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM IN SOUTH CAROLINA
General description. As mentioned, the Food Stamp Program is 
administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and operated by the 
states to help low-income individuals and families obtain more nutri-
tious diets. The federal government pays the cost of food stamp benefi ts 
and also pays half of the states’ administrative costs. Set by the federal 
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government, the monthly benefi t formula is the same for all states in 
the contiguous United States. In FY 2005, the maximum benefi t for a 
household of three was $399. 
Benefi ts are provided to households, and to qualify, households 
have to meet income and resource tests (unless all members are re-
ceiving benefi ts from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 
[TANF] or Supplemental Security Income [SSI] programs, which 
makes the household “categorically eligible”). The federal government 
sets eligibility standards at 130 percent of the poverty line based on 
gross monthly income, and at 100 percent of the poverty line based on 
net income. Most households must meet both the gross and the net in-
come tests, but a household with an elderly or disabled person only has 
to meet the net income test.1 
Application procedures. In South Carolina, applicants may com-
plete an application form for food stamps at the local Department of So-
cial Services (DSS) offi ce, or may download the form from the agency 
Web site and deliver, mail, or fax the application to the local DSS offi ce. 
Applications are considered fi led on the date they are received by the 
county offi ces. An interview with the applicant is required for approval, 
either in person or on the telephone, and information regarding identity, 
residency, income, and expenses must be verifi ed. 
Local DSS offi ces must approve applications within 27 days after 
receipt in the county offi ce, and benefi ts must be accessible within 30 
days.2 Actual processing time from application to receipt of benefi ts 
averages 16 days statewide. In cases where an application is denied, the 
notifi cation must reach the household by the thirtieth day after receipt. 
Income reporting. Clients are required to report and verify all 
sources of income, including earnings, at initial certifi cation, with pay 
stubs or an offi cial employer’s statement being needed to verify earn-
ings. For clients receiving other government benefi ts, the agency can 
verify these sources by accessing automated records on-line. 
Food stamp eligibility and benefi ts are determined on a monthly 
basis; however, rules for reporting income changes depend on the cli-
ents’ circumstances. Households in which all members are elderly or 
disabled must report changes to the local DSS offi ce within 10 days. All 
other households must report changes when the household’s gross in-
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come exceeds 130 percent of poverty or when the household moves out 
of the state. Recipients are also allowed to report decreases in income, 
as these would allow them to increase their food stamp benefi ts.
Recertifi cation. In addition to these reporting requirements, recipi-
ents are required to complete paperwork or interviews to recertify their 
eligibility on a periodic basis. Recipients on fi xed incomes, such as dis-
ability income, are required to recertify less often than those recipients 
with variable incomes. 
As we said above, prior to October 2002, South Carolina required 
most food stamp recipients with earnings and other fl uctuating sources 
of income to recertify their eligibility quarterly and most recipients with 
fi xed incomes to recertify annually. For those with fl uctuating incomes, 
face-to-face interviews were only required once a year and mail-in re-
certifi cations were required each quarter. After October 2002, the re-
certifi cation interval for recipients with fl uctuating incomes increased 
from three to six months. In addition, a larger number of recertifi cation 
interviews were conducted over the phone, and income verifi cation pro-
cedures were relaxed.3
Case closures. Cases are certifi ed for the intervals listed in Table 
4.1. If a household fails to recertify its eligibility, its case is automatical-
ly closed at the end of the certifi cation period. Cases may also be closed 
at recertifi cation if their paperwork is incomplete, if households fail to 
participate in interviews, or if their incomes cannot be verifi ed. Cases 
are also closed at recertifi cation or at other times if a reported change in 
income or resources brings them above the applicable thresholds. Prior 
to March 2004, some cases could be closed for failure to participate 
in required employment and training activities.4 In addition, cases are 
closed if the client cannot be located or moves out of state, as well as 
under some other circumstances.
Once one of these issues arises, the household is sent a notice tell-
ing it that eligibility will be terminated in 10 days. Recertifi cations are 
due in the fi rst half of the last month of certifi cation; people who miss 
this deadline are sent their notices near the middle of the month and 
have their cases terminated at the end of the month. If a client reports 
an earnings change that puts her over 130 percent of the poverty line, 
the 10-day timely notice period begins the fi rst day of the next month. 
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For example, if the change occurs on June 15, the report must be re-
ceived by July 10 in order for the client not to have to repay overages in 
benefi ts. If the client reports in the last 10 days of the month, her case 
cannot be closed until the fi rst of the following month. So, for example, 
if a client reports an earnings change between September 21 and Sep-
tember 30 that renders her ineligible, her case cannot be closed until 
November 1.
Clients are required to verify wages at certifi cation and reverify 
at recertifi cation. Unless clients report increases in income during the 
three- or six-month certifi cation period, ineligibles are not identifi ed 
until the end of that period. If a UI wage match shows a discrepancy at 
either certifi cation or recertifi cation, clients are asked to verify wages 
again. However, if a wage match shows a discrepancy during the inter-
vening period, claims workers ignore the information until recertifi ca-
tion. If the client has collected food stamp benefi ts to which she was 
not entitled, the claims worker in the county seeks reimbursement from 
the client by establishing a repayment agreement. If that does not work, 
the case is sent to “tax intercept” and future tax refunds are garnished 
to repay the overage. 
Caseload trends. Food stamp caseloads plummeted during the late 
1990s in South Carolina and elsewhere. The state’s food stamp caseload 
declined from 143,000 families in 1996 to 120,000 in 2000. Since 2000, 
the food stamp caseload has increased dramatically, climbing to more 
than 226,000 families by the end of 2005. 







Unstable circumstances (e.g., no 
income), migrant worker 1–2 months 1–2 months
Fluctuating income (e.g., earnings) 3 months 6 months
Fixed income 12 months 12 months
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Conceptual framework. The conceptual framework that we use to 
examine the different reasons for food stamp exits is Moffi tt’s (2003) 
model of program compliance. In Moffi tt’s model, households receive 
and value different levels of income, which vary depending on their 
participation in assistance programs, such as the Food Stamp Program. 
Households also care about other things, such as stigma (Moffi tt 1983), 
household production, and leisure; these things all vary with program 
participation.
To remain on a program, households must exert effort to comply 
with the program’s rules by completing their recertifi cation paperwork 
and interviews. Higher levels of compliance increase the chances—but 
do not guarantee—that a household will remain in good standing with 
a program and continue receiving benefi ts. The chance element is im-
portant because even if a household complies with the rules, it may be 
randomly terminated—paperwork can be lost, information can be mis-
typed into computers, etc. Increased efforts by households to comply, 
of course, also raise the effective costs of program participation to those 
households.
Households in this model rationally choose their compliance efforts 
to balance the anticipated monetary and other benefi ts of program par-
ticipation against the costs of compliance, and this choice has some 
straightforward implications for program behavior. On the one hand, 
policies (such as longer recertifi cation intervals) that unambiguously 
reduce compliance costs should lead to higher levels of compliance and 
hence to higher levels of participation. On the other hand, larger in-
comes or smaller benefi ts, which lower the relative gains to program 
participation, should reduce compliance and participation.
The impacts of other changes are more diffi cult to predict—income 
volatility is a case in point. Variable incomes, especially in households 
with few assets and limited access to credit markets, increase the utility 
of food stamps and other social insurance programs (Gundersen and 
Ziliak 2003). At the same time, more volatile incomes increase compli-
ance costs. In South Carolina, food stamp households with fl uctuating 
incomes are required to recertify more frequently than other house-
holds. Even if this were not the case, income volatility would increase 
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the probability that a participating household would become ineligible 
in a given month. It would also raise documentation costs, for instance, 
by increasing the sources of income that would have to be reported and 
verifi ed. Because volatility increases the benefi ts and costs of program 
participation and also affects eligibility itself, the net impacts are am-
biguous and a matter for empirical investigation.
The foregoing discussion treats compliance as if it were a uni-
dimensional concept, but of course with multiple program rules there 
are many possible dimensions of compliance. The discussion also over-
looks the important issue of purposeful underreporting. The various 
rules and additional eligibility considerations give rise to the multiple 
reasons for program exits, which we subsequently examine.
Empirical studies. There have been numerous studies of the food 
stamp caseload and food stamp participation. Many of these have sim-
ply examined the incidence of food stamp participation, either by mod-
eling the aggregate number of people or households receiving benefi ts 
(Currie and Grogger 2001; Danielson and Klerman 2006; Kabbani and 
Wilde 2003; Kornfeld 2002; Wallace and Blank 1999; Wilde et al. 2000; 
Ziliak, Gundersen, and Figlio 2003) or by modeling receipt among 
individual households (Currie and Grogger 2001; Farrell et al. 2003; 
Fraker and Moffi tt 1988; Haider, Jacknowitz, and Schoeni 2003; Keane 
and Moffi tt 1998; Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold 2007). Some other 
studies break individual participation decisions into separate entry and 
exit decisions but examine these as simple bivariate outcomes (Blank 
and Ruggles 1996; Gleason, Schochet, and Moffi t 1998; Hofferth 2003; 
Mills et al. 2001; Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu 2006a,b; Staveley, Stevens, 
and Wilde 2002). To our knowledge, previous food stamp studies have 
not modeled different types of exit outcomes.5
There has been less research on food stamp policies, other than 
benefi t levels. Many studies fail to include measures of policies and 
procedures at all. Several other studies include broad and imprecise 
measures like the average recertifi cation interval or the distribution of 
intervals in a state (Currie and Grogger 2001; Hofferth 2003; Kabbani 
and Wilde 2003; Kornfeld 2002; Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold 
2007); these studies have tended to generate weak and sometimes con-
tradictory fi ndings. Stronger results are found in a few studies that have 
been more careful in measuring policies and procedures. For instance, 
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Bartlett, Burstein, and Hamilton (2004) gather detailed information on 
administrative policies, such as outreach efforts and operating hours, 
and on administrator and staff attitudes across food stamp offi ces in 
different localities. They fi nd that these administrative characteristics 
infl uence participation behavior. Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2006a,b) 
use administrative data from South Carolina and look in a detailed way 
at the timing of exits from individual food stamp spells; they fi nd that 
exits coincided with the expected timing of recertifi cations. In an analy-
sis of administrative data from Maryland, Staveley, Stevens, and Wilde 
(2002) also fi nd that the timing of food stamp exits was clustered at 
recertifi cation dates.
The role of income volatility in food stamp participation has been 
largely overlooked in previous research. One exception, however, is a 
study by Farrell et al. (2003), which compares the income histories of 
food stamp participants and nonparticipants at different points in time. 
The authors fi nd that participants have lower and less volatile incomes 
than eligible nonparticipants.
DATA
Food stamp spells. The data for the empirical analyses of food 
stamp exits come from electronic case management records from South 
Carolina covering the period from July 1997 until January 2005. The 
records, which are maintained by the Offi ce of Research and Statistics 
(ORS) of the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board, cover 
the universe of households that applied to and participated in the state’s 
Food Stamp Program over the period. The records contain a wealth of 
household- and client-level information, including the starting and end-
ing dates of participation spells, demographic characteristics of house-
holds, geographic identifi ers, and benefi t and reported income amounts 
during each month of program receipt. 
Because of the large number of food stamp cases in South Carolina, 
we reduced the analysis extract by using a 1-in-11 random sample of 
longitudinal cases. We then further reduced the analysis sample by only 
considering records associated with approved applications, records with 
complete information about the processes involved in continuing a spell 
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of program receipt, and records describing food stamp cases with adults 
and children present.
The units of analysis for our investigation are food stamp spells. 
Food stamp spells can begin anytime during a month. However, once 
a spell begins, benefi ts are only paid once a month. Also, when a case 
is terminated, the offi cial closing date almost always occurs at the end 
of the month. Because of the timing of payments and case closings, we 
treat the spell data as a series of discrete, monthly observations, with the 
initial and terminal observations for each spell corresponding to the fi rst 
and last months of benefi t receipt. We only consider spells that began 
during our observation window and accordingly drop ongoing, or left-
censored, spells. Also, we ignore short breaks in spells (breaks that last 
one month or less) and instead treat the two adjoining spells as a single 
spell of participation.6
For each month that a case continues, the records indicate the ben-
efi ts that the household received as well as all of the economic infor-
mation that enters into the benefi t calculation, including gross reported 
earned and unearned income amounts, deductions and exemptions, and 
net incomes. We use several of these income and expense variables in 
our descriptive and multivariate analyses, adjusting all dollar amounts 
to 2005 levels using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consum-
ers (CPI-U).
From the information on demographic characteristics, we construct 
measures of the number and age composition of the case members. We 
also construct indicators for the age, sex, race, educational attainment, 
and marital status of the household member heading the case.
The records indicate the county of residence for the household, 
which allows us to link the administrative data to measures of the 
county unemployment rate to control for local economic conditions. 
It also allows us to link the data to measures of the population density 
to control for the level of urbanization. We further include controls for 
whether the county is on the state border.
Once the programmatic, demographic, and geographic information 
is processed, we make one fi nal set of exclusions to the data. First, 
we limit the analysis to households in which the adult in charge was 
between the ages of 18 and 59 and no other adults were over the age 
of 59. Second, we restrict the analysis to households in which the head 
of the case was white or black. Only 5 percent of cases were identifi ed 
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as being of another race or ethnicity, leaving us with too few cases to 
examine these groups. Third, we drop a small number of observations 
with missing or incomplete information. Our fi nal analysis data set con-
tains 398,586 monthly observations from 30,569 spells of food stamp 
receipt.
Reasons for exit. For every case that is closed, the administrative 
records give a reason for closure. There are 33 detailed codes that are 
used at least once in our records. We grouped the codes into fi ve broad 
categories: cases that ended because the household
 1)  missed its recertifi cation,
 2)  lost eligibility because its income or assets were too high,
 3) lost eligibility because it failed to provide information or pro-
vide reliable information,
 4) lost eligibility because of some other reason, or
 5)  voluntarily quit.
The detailed codes, our categorizations, and the relevant frequen-
cies are reported in Table 4.2. 
The tabulations of the reasons for exit reveal that 50 percent of cases 
headed by blacks and 51 percent of cases headed by whites ended be-
cause the clients let their certifi cation periods lapse without submitting 
any paperwork for a new certifi cation. This confi rms the fi ndings from 
earlier studies by Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2006a,b) that recertifi cation 
is an important element in food stamp exits. The tabulations also indi-
cate that just over one-fi fth of the exits—23 percent among cases head-
ed by blacks and 17 percent among cases headed by whites—occurred 
because the households either reported or were found to have a change 
in income or resources that made them ineligible. Approximately one-
sixth of cases ended because the households failed to provide suffi cient 
or reliable information. Nine percent of cases lost their eligibility for 
some other reason, most typically because the households moved or 
could not be located, and 3 to 4 percent withdrew voluntarily.
UI earnings data. For each client in the food stamp case manage-
ment records, the ORS has obtained quarterly earnings records, if any 
exist, from the state’s UI system. The UI database contains earnings 
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Table 4.2  Detailed Reasons for Food Stamp Exits by Race of Case Head
Black White
Reason for exit Number Percent Number Percent
Missed recertifi cation 6,458 50.36 5,049 50.88
MR: Failed to fi le mandatory recertifi cation 4,316 33.66 3,398 34.24
CE: Closed–certifi cation ended (S-Gen)a 2,142 16.70 1,651 16.64
Income or assets too high 2,906 22.66 1,699 17.12
IN: Income (net) meets/exceeds req. 2,119 16.52 1,252 12.62
IE: Increase–earned income 602 4.69 321 3.23
IU: Unearned income exceeds limits 111 0.87 70 0.71
RE: Resources 72 0.56 56 0.56
LS: Lump sum ineligibility 2 0.02 0 0.00
Failed to provide reliable information 2,075 16.18 1,796 18.10
FI: Failed to furnish information 1,398 10.90 1,272 12.82
FP: Failed to provide info. (S-Gen) 438 3.42 274 2.76
VR: Verifi cation—failed to provide 153 1.19 198 2.00
FC: Failed to complete interview (S-Gen) 52 0.41 30 0.30
IM: Incompletely verifi ed MR 34 0.27 22 0.22
Other loss of eligibility 990 7.72 972 9.80
NR: Nonresident 483 3.77 516 5.20
CL: Cannot locate 231 1.80 297 2.99
HH: No eligible household members 102 0.80 69 0.70
AE: Application opened in error 32 0.25 24 0.24
ET: Failure to comply with E&T req. 28 0.22 15 0.15
DE: Death 24 0.19 13 0.13
SH: Not separate FS household 24 0.19 11 0.11
WR: Work req.—refused/failed to comply 24 0.19 3 0.03
CC: Opened/closed case with claim 15 0.12 9 0.09
AB: ABAWD time limit expiredb 12 0.09 4 0.04
QC: Refused to cooperate with QCc 7 0.05 2 0.02
CH: Change in law/policy 4 0.03 0 0.00
FE: Fail to accept reim. comp.—FS E&T 1 0.01 4 0.04
CD: Drug conviction 0 0.00 2 0.02
DR: Disqualifi ed—misrep. residency/ID 0 0.00 2 0.02
DF: HH disqualifi ed for fraud 1 0.01 0 0.00
FF: Fleeing felon—probation paroled 1 0.01 0 0.00
RJ: Refused to accept a job 0 0.00 1 0.01
SS: SSN—refused/failed to furnish or apply 1 0.01 0 0.00
Voluntary exit 394 3.07 407 4.10
VW: Voluntary withdrawal 362 2.82 390 3.93
VQ: Voluntary quit 32 0.25 17 0.17
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information for most private, nonagricultural employers. However, it 
overlooks government employment and some types of private-sector 
jobs, such as agricultural and domestic work. It also misses employ-
ment by people who commute out of the state to work. 
We construct measures of the total amount of earnings for all clients 
in the food stamp household for the current quarter of a given spell ob-
servation, for the previous quarter, and for the previous year. We adjust 
these amounts using the CPI-U and express them as monthly equiva-
lents to make them comparable to the reported earnings and income 
fi gures. To measure earnings volatility, we calculate the coeffi cient of 
variation for the household’s covered earnings for the previous year. We 
also create an indicator for the maximum quarterly earnings during the 
previous year and an indicator for having no reported earnings during 
that period.
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 list statistics describing the characteristics of 
food stamp cases from South Carolina in the months in which the cases 
closed. The characteristics were measured as of the start of the month, 
and the cases generally closed at the end of the month, so the character-
istics refl ect conditions immediately preceding the closures. Table 4.3 
lists statistics for cases in households headed by blacks, while Table 4.4 
lists statistics for whites. In each table, averages of the characteristics 
are calculated according to one of fi ve conditions, depending on the 
reason why the cases closed.
The rows at the top of each table describe economic conditions of 
the cases, including the level of food stamp benefi ts, reported levels 
a “S-Gen” stands for “system-generated,” as opposed to being entered by a caseworker.
b “ABAWD” stands for “able-bodied adults without dependents.”
c “QC” stands for “quality control audit.”
d “Fleeing felon—probation parole” means that the person was declared ineligible because 
he or she either has a felony arrest warrant or is in violation of probation or parole re-
strictions.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from South Carolina food stamp administrative records.
Table 4.2 (continued)
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Failed to provide 
information
Other loss 
of eligibility Voluntary exit
Case income and benefi tsa
Benefi ts 224.3 200.1 272.3 293.0 238.8
Reported earned income 646.4 731.8 332.3 249.0 424.6
Reported unearned income 275.1 358.9 288.2 285.2 363.5
Countable income 568.8 683.8 375.7 298.1 496.2
Any earnings start of spell (%) 57.1 60.0 39.3 28.0 43.4
No income start of spell (%) 13.7 9.9 26.5 30.7 17.5
UI earnings current quarter 912.2 1,235.3 776.1 261.7 839.7
UI earnings last quarter 781.9 1,104.8 625.4 305.8 742.6
Average UI earnings last year 752.4 1,150.4 631.4 336.4 720.2
C.V. UI earnings last year 0.579 0.497 0.662 0.650 0.595
Maximum UI earnings last year 1,121.7 1,608.6 1,004.9 594.3 1,110.4
No UI earnings last year (%) 18.9 14.1 23.6 41.8 25.9
Spell length (months) 11.5 10.4 11.9 11.8 11.6
PI characteristicsb
Female (%) 95.8 94.0 93.9 95.7 93.9
Age 31.6 34.5 30.7 30.5 34.4
Educationc 11.8 11.9 11.7 11.5 11.8
Currently married (%) 12.3 21.6 11.2 8.2 17.3
Formerly married (%) 26.8 28.5 25.4 29.3 34.0
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Case composition
Number in case 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0
Number of children 0–2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4
Number of children 3–5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3
Number of children 6–11 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Number of children 12–14 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Number of children 15–17 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Number of adults 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3
Geographic characteristics
County unemployment rate 5.6 6.1 5.9 6.0 6.4
County population densityd 202.2 186.7 211.4 190.9 180.5
Border county (%)e 36.3 34.2 39.2 38.2 37.8
Number of exits 6,458 2,906 2,075 990 394
NOTE: Dollar amounts are expressed in 2005 dollars; UI earnings amounts are expressed in monthly equivalents.
a All categories of “Case income and benefi ts” are in $ unless otherwise specifi ed, except for “C.V. UI earnings last year,” which gives the 
coeffi cient of variation for unemployment insurance earnings.
b “PI” stands for “primary informant,” the head of the case.
c Values for “Education” measure average years in school.
d Measured as people per square mile in county. 
e “Border county” is a 0/1 indicator for whether a person lives in a county that borders on another state; the statistic refl ects the percentage 
of people living in such counties.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from South Carolina food stamp administrative records.  
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of eligibility Voluntary exit
Case income and benefi tsa
Benefi ts 254.9 233.3 302.5 303.3 288.3
Reported earned income 645.4 721.1 301.2 280.0 336.7
Reported unearned income 250.3 320.9 256.4 236.2 354.4
Countable income 523.0 623.5 308.0 281.6 396.7
Any earnings start of spell (%) 56.0 57.6 35.6 30.3 39.8
No income start of spell (%) 17.7 14.2 32.9 35.2 23.3
UI earnings current quarter 812.3 1,207.2 719.9 300.9 741.8
UI earnings last quarter 700.4 1,051.1 584.9 361.3 615.7
Average UI earnings last year 698.7 1,097.0 602.6 377.5 684.6
C.V. UI earnings last year 0.670 0.548 0.741 0.666 0.584
Maximum UI earnings last year 1,097.2 1,605.2 1,031.0 664.1 1,087.3
No UI earnings last year (%) 23.1 19.1 26.6 42.4 36.1
Spell length (months) 9.8 8.6 8.9 9.0 8.7
PI characteristicsb
Female (%) 89.1 87.6 89.4 92.4 88.2
Age 31.5 33.2 30.8 30.2 33.2
Educationc 11.2 11.5 11.2 11.1 11.4
Currently married (%) 35.5 46.1 29.3 25.0 36.9
Formerly married (%) 41.7 34.4 44.6 42.0 46.4
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Case composition
Number in case 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.3
Number of children 0–2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
Number of children 3–5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3
Number of children 6–11 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
Number of children 12–14 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Number of children 15–17 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Number of adults 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.4
Geographic characteristics
County unemployment rate 5.3 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.8
County population densityd 205.2 200.4 210.2 202.4 203.8
Border county (%)e 57.1 59.2 60.9 61.3 58.0
Number of exits 5,049 1,699 1,796 972 407
NOTE: Dollar amounts are expressed in 2005 dollars; UI earnings amounts are expressed in monthly equivalents. 
a All categories of “Case income and benefi ts” are in $ unless otherwise specifi ed.
b “PI” stands for “primary informant,” the head of the case.
c Values for “Education” measure average years in school.
d Measured as people per square mile in county.
e “Border county” is a 0/1 indicator for whether a person lives in a county that borders on another state; the statistic refl ects the percentage 
of people living in such counties.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from South Carolina food stamp administrative records.  
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of income, and the earnings history reported into the state UI system. 
It is immediately evident that the economic conditions of cases differ 
substantially depending on clients’ reasons for exit. Cases in which the 
recipients lost their eligibility for reasons of income or resources tend 
to have the lowest level of benefi ts. Cases whose recipients failed to 
recertify also have relatively low benefi ts, which is consistent with such 
recipients having reduced incentives for complying with program rules. 
Cases that ended because the recipients failed to provide necessary or 
reliable information and cases where the recipients lost eligibility for 
other reasons had the highest benefi ts on average, while cases that end-
ed voluntarily fell in between these extremes. These associations apply 
to both black- and white-headed households.
While the average monthly benefi ts for households that missed their 
recertifi cations were low in a relative sense, they were still substan-
tial—$224 for blacks and $255 for whites—on an absolute basis. To the 
extent that clients remained eligible, their willingness to give up such 
large sums when letting their certifi cations lapse suggests that the effec-
tive costs of program compliance are high. 
The differences among cases whose clients had different reasons for 
exit were even more pronounced when it came to incomes and earnings. 
As might be expected, households that lost eligibility for income and 
resource reasons tended to be the most economically advantaged, with 
the highest reported earnings and countable incomes and the strongest 
and least volatile histories of UI-covered earnings. At the other end of 
the spectrum were households in our residual category, whose clients 
lost their eligibility for reasons other than high incomes, missed recerti-
fi cations, or failures to provide information. 
Relative to cases that ended for income reasons, the cases in the 
residual category were roughly three times as likely to have begun their 
food stamp participation spells with no reported income whatsoever. 
On average, the residual case clients had countable incomes that were 
less than half the size of cases that ended for income reasons and cov-
ered earnings that were less than a third the size of this group. The dif-
ferences in covered earnings were starkest in the quarters in which the 
cases actually ended, indicating possible continuing disadvantage after 
the clients left the Food Stamp Program.7 Cases that failed to get recer-
tifi ed had economic resources that were below those of income-ineli-
gibles but above those of the other groups. Cases that ended voluntarily 
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came next, followed by cases that ended because of clients’ failure to 
provide information. Cases that ended for information reasons had the 
highest levels of covered-earnings volatility.
Cases that lost eligibility for income reasons also tended to have the 
shortest durations, while cases that missed their recertifi cations tended 
to last more than a month longer. Among blacks, cases that ended for 
information reasons, other reasons, and voluntarily were slightly longer 
on average than cases that ended because of missed recertifi cations. 
Among whites, the opposite was true.
The demographic patterns are generally consistent with the income 
and earnings patterns: cases that lost eligibility for income and resource 
reasons had higher average levels of education and marriage and fewer 
children than other cases. Cases in our residual category had the low-
est rates of marriage, lowest levels of education, and the most young 
children. 
Although many of the patterns of food stamp use among households 
headed by blacks and whites are similar, there are some differences 
worth noting. Average spell lengths are two to three months longer for 
blacks than for whites, even though average benefi ts are slightly lower 
for blacks than for whites. The longer spells for blacks are consistent 
with national data from Wolkwitz (2007) that indicate higher rates of 
participation for blacks conditional on their eligibility. Black food stamp 
households are less likely to be headed by men than white households. 
Also, substantially fewer black household heads are currently or were 
formerly married compared to white household heads. 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
For our multivariate analyses we estimate discrete-time competing-
risk hazard models of different types of food stamp exits (see Allison 
1982 for a thorough discussion of discrete-time models). The hazard 
rate, which refers to the probability that a spell of remaining in one 
situation ends at a given point in time, conditional on the spell having 
lasted up to that time, is a standard tool for analyzing program behavior. 
Hazard models are especially useful in this regard because they account 
for the fact that some spells of program participation are not observed to 
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their ends: they either continue past the analyst’s observation window 
(in this case past January 2005) or are missing information at some 
point during their duration. The competing-risk framework further ac-
counts for the fact that there are several reasons why a spell might end 
but that only one of those reasons is actually observed. For example, 
a spell that ended because of a missed recertifi cation might have soon 
ended anyway for eligibility reasons.
The discrete-time version of the competing-risk model is easy to 
apply. Estimation can be carried out with a multinomial logit model 
in which the different reasons for exit in any month are the outcomes. 
We model exits for four reasons: 1) missed recertifi cations, 2) losses of 
eligibility for income or resource reasons, 3) failures to provide infor-
mation, and 4) all other reasons. The last category combines voluntary 
exits and other eligibility losses from our descriptive analyses. This col-
lapsing was necessary because of the relatively small number of exits 
in each category; however, it may make the results for the combined 
category hard to interpret.
Another advantage of the discrete-time model is that it is a straight-
forward way to incorporate controls for duration dependence in spells. 
Our models include 36 monthly dummy variables that cover the fi rst 
three years of a spell duration and four semiannual dummy variables 
that cover the next two years; thus, we essentially adopt a semipara-
metric specifi cation for the spell duration, which is akin to a Cox pro-
portional hazard model. The models also include quarterly, semiannual, 
and annual duration indicators corresponding to the likely ends of cer-
tifi cation periods.
Besides the duration controls, all of our models also include con-
trols for the fi scal year of the observation to account for unmeasured 
statewide changes in policies, program formulas, economic conditions, 
and attitudes. For brevity’s sake, we do not report the estimation results 
for the duration or time-series controls, though the complete results 
are available upon request. The models were estimated separately for 
households headed by blacks and whites.
Analyses of all exits. We fi rst report marginal effects and standard 
errors of the hazard of making any type of food stamp exit. These ef-
fects were calculated from the competing-risk model and represent the 
sum of the marginal effects for each of the four specifi c types of exit. 
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The results, which are reported separately for black- and white-headed 
cases, are listed in Table 4.5. Because they describe exits generally, the 
marginal effects in Table 4.5 are broadly comparable to results previ-
ously reported by Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2006a) and by other re-
searchers. However, unlike most previous specifi cations, the models 
include detailed controls for earnings histories.
At the top of the table are marginal effects for benefi ts, reported 
earned incomes, and reported unearned incomes. For blacks and whites 
the marginal effects have the anticipated signs: higher benefi ts reduce 
the probability of leaving the Food Stamp Program, and higher incomes 
increase the probability. For blacks, all three effects are statistically sig-
nifi cant, though not especially large. A $100 increase in monthly ben-
efi ts is estimated to lower the probability of exit, which is about 5 per-
cent on average, by 0.19 percent. A $100 increase in earnings raises the 
probability of exit by 0.05 percent, while a $100 increase in unearned 
income raises the probability of exit by 0.09 percent. For whites, the 
estimated marginal effects are smaller, and only the estimated effect for 
unearned income is signifi cant.
More surprising are the next two sets of results, which indicate that 
households that start their food stamp spells without any income have 
higher exit rates than other households, while households that start 
either their spells or their subsequent certifi cation periods with some 
positive earnings have substantially lower exit rates than other house-
holds. Though the results seem counterintuitive when viewed from the 
perspective of household resources, there is a policy basis for the fi nd-
ings. South Carolina instructs its caseworkers to grant short certifi ca-
tion periods to transient households and households without any stable 
means of support. South Carolina also requires nonworking households 
to report changes in their employment within 10 days, whereas work-
ing households only need to make immediate reports if their income 
changes bring them above the gross income threshold. In addition to 
these explanations, households with children but without earnings, and 
especially those without income, are likely to be unstable.
As expected, higher levels of UI-covered earnings in the preceding 
quarter are associated with faster exits from the Food Stamp Program. 
Given that the models already control for current earned income, the 
estimates for previous quarter’s UI earnings most likely refl ect a recent 
history of job-holding and attachment to the labor force. Black house-
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Table 4.5  Estimated Marginal Effects for the Probability of Exiting the Food Stamp Program for Any Reason, 
Reported Separately by the Race of the Case Head
Black White
Coeffi cient (Std. error) Coeffi cient (Std. error)
Benefi ts (/100)a −0.188*** (0.047) −0.101 (0.070)
Reported earned income (/100) 0.047*** (0.011) 0.030 (0.017)
Reported unearned income (/100) 0.091*** (0.014) 0.066*** (0.021)
No income at start of spell 0.467*** (0.081) 0.852*** (0.130)
Any earnings start of cert. period −0.690*** (0.082) −1.072*** (0.137)
UI earnings last quarter (/300) 0.052*** (0.005) 0.063*** (0.008)
Avg. UI earnings last year (/300) −0.015 (0.013) −0.081*** (0.017)
C.V. UI earnings last year 0.289*** (0.070) 0.109 (0.100)
Max. UI earnings last year (/300) 0.030*** (0.007) 0.056*** (0.010)
No UI earnings last year 0.227 (0.122) 0.166 (0.167)
Female −0.900*** (0.152) −0.317** (0.144)
Age spline, 18–21 years 0.090 (0.068) −0.247** (0.102)
Age spline, 22–40 years −0.018*** (0.006) −0.044*** (0.010)
Age spline, 41+ years −0.047*** (0.009) −0.089*** (0.018)
Education spline, 0–12 years −0.044 (0.030) −0.035 (0.040)
Education spline, 12+ years 0.204*** (0.045) 0.217** (0.088)
Completed high school or GED 0.317*** (0.080) 0.376*** (0.126)
Completed college −0.357 (0.247) −0.548 (0.471)
Currently married 0.411*** (0.099) 0.442*** (0.131)
Formerly married 0.339*** (0.068) 0.549*** (0.116)
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Number of children 0–2 −0.473*** (0.067) −0.602*** (0.107)
Number of children 3–5 −0.512*** (0.067) −0.657*** (0.105)
Number of children 6–11 −0.475*** (0.056) −0.481*** (0.089)
Number of children 12–14 −0.446*** (0.067) −0.524*** (0.110)
Number of children 15–17 −0.531*** (0.072) −0.367*** (0.122)
Number of adults 0.106 (0.071) 0.169 (0.111)
County unemployment rate −0.030** (0.013) −0.037 (0.026)
County population density −0.015 (0.021) −0.002 (0.037)
Border county 0.177*** (0.050) 0.197** (0.080)
Spell quarter (before 10/02) 2.973*** (0.370) 5.300*** (0.763)
Spell 6 months (after 10/02) 1.432*** (0.324) 1.647*** (0.504)
Spell year (before 10/02) 0.437 (0.573) 1.312 (2.220)
Spell year (after 10/02) 2.190*** (0.758) 3.955 (2.137)
AE x spell quarter (bef. 10/02)b 1.357*** (0.186) 2.433*** (0.344)
AE x spell 6 mo. (after 10/02) 5.270*** (0.675) 9.945*** (1.373)
AE x spell year (before 10/02) 0.011 (0.288) −0.752 (0.528)
AE x spell year (after 10/02) −0.640** (0.326) −0.348 (0.681)
Log likelihood −56,171.88 −40,012.18
Monthly observations / spells 256,406 / 17,686 142,180 / 12,883
NOTE: The columns report estimated marginal effects (in percentage terms) of the probability of exiting the Food Stamp Program for any reason. The 
estimates are derived from multinomial logit competing-risk models of food stamp exits for four different reasons. In addition to the listed controls, the 
model includes controls for fi scal year and spell duration. Estimated standard errors appear in parentheses. ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); 
*** signifi cant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
a The designation “/100” means that the number has been divided by 100 to help make the coeffi cients roughly comparable. Similarly, “/300” means divided 
by 300. This is done because the fi gures come from quarterly rather than monthly data. Dividing by 300 makes the quarterly fi gures comparable to the 
monthly amounts.
b AE stands for “any earnings at the start of the certifi cation period.”
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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holds with more variable UI earnings also have higher probabilities of 
exit. As later results for specifi c reasons of exit will reveal, variable 
earnings appear to be more indicative of unstable household circum-
stances generally than of extra compliance costs or frequent income 
eligibility changes. The maximum level of UI earnings in the previous 
year is also positively associated with exits, which seems consistent 
with maximum earnings acting as a proxy for earnings capacity.
The results for the demographic variables fi t with fi ndings from pre-
vious studies. Being female, being older, having more children, and 
living in a high unemployment area are all negatively associated with 
food stamp exits. Completing high school or a GED, completing more 
postsecondary schooling, and being currently or formerly married are 
positively associated with exits.
The last eight rows of estimates in the table are from dummy vari-
able controls for likely recertifi cation months and for interactions of 
those dummy variables with the household’s earnings status at the be-
ginning of its certifi cation period. As with Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu 
(2006a), the estimates in the last eight rows indicate that households 
were substantially more likely to leave the Food Stamp Program in re-
certifi cation months than in other months, with households that reported 
incomes being even more likely to leave at the quarterly or semiannual 
dates than other households.
Analyses of exits for specifi c reasons. Estimated marginal effects 
from the same competing-risk models, but this time calculated sepa-
rately for each of the specifi c reasons of exit, are reported in Tables 4.6 
and 4.7. The estimates in the tables indicate that higher levels of food 
stamp benefi ts are associated with a lower probability of missing recer-
tifi cations. For black-headed households, higher benefi ts are also sig-
nifi cantly negatively associated with failing to provide information; for 
white-headed households, the association is negative but insignifi cant. 
Each of these results is consistent with higher benefi ts incentivizing ef-
forts to stay on the program. Higher benefi ts are positively associated 
with exits for income ineligibility, though neither of the estimates is 
statistically signifi cant. Higher benefi ts are also positively associated 
with other losses in eligibility and voluntary withdrawals among black-
headed households.
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Higher reported incomes are positively associated with exits for 
missed recertifi cations and income ineligibility but negatively associat-
ed with exits for information reasons. The fi rst two results are expected, 
while the results for income ineligibility may refl ect diffi culties in ob-
taining documentation for low-paying jobs or refl ect misreported earn-
ings amounts being detected. As with the results for earned incomes, 
reported unearned incomes are positively associated with exits for in-
come ineligibility and negatively associated with exits for information 
reasons.
Households that report no income at the start of their food stamp 
spells are at substantially higher risk of losing eligibility for informa-
tion reasons or exiting through the residual category. The fi rst result is 
consistent with misreporting, while the second result is consistent with 
no-income households having unsustainable living circumstances that 
make it hard for them to remain intact, independent, or living in the 
same place. For white-headed households, starting a spell without any 
income is also positively associated with missed recertifi cations. Re-
sults for the any-earnings indicator are even stronger. Black- and white-
headed households that begin a spell or certifi cation interval without 
any earnings are at substantially increased risk of exiting the Food 
Stamp Program for all four reasons.
The amount of covered earnings in the previous quarter is signifi -
cantly positively associated with exits for all four reasons. These results 
are consistent with expectations. Higher maximum-covered earnings in 
the previous year are also signifi cantly positively associated with missed 
recertifi cations and information problems for black-headed households 
and with missed recertifi cations, income ineligibility, and information 
problems for white-headed households. The absence of any covered 
earnings in the previous year is associated with substantially more exits 
for voluntary reasons and other types of ineligibility.
The positive association between covered-earnings volatility and 
food stamp exits appears to be limited to the residual category. Again, 
this would be consistent with other evidence that households in this 
group have highly unstable circumstances. Covered-earnings volatility 
is signifi cantly negatively associated with exits for income ineligibility 
among white-headed households but essentially uncorrelated with these 
types of exits for black-headed households.
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Table 4.6  Results from Discrete-Time Competing-Risk Hazard Models of Food Stamp Exits for Specifi c Reasons: 









Benefi ts −0.155*** 0.021 −0.129*** 0.075***
Reported earned income 0.013*** 0.066*** −0.044*** 0.012**
Reported unearned income 0.006 0.085*** −0.023*** 0.023***
No income at start of spell 0.007 −0.014 0.268*** 0.205***
Any earnings, start of cert. period −0.116*** −0.249*** −0.193*** −0.132***
UI earnings last quarter 0.019*** 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.007**
Avg. UI earnings last year −0.025*** 0.018*** −0.008 0.0005
C.V. UI earnings last year 0.007 0.036 0.042 0.203***
Max. UI earnings last year 0.015*** 0.004 0.009** 0.002
No UI earnings last year −0.078** −0.067 −0.087 0.458***
Female −0.244*** −0.120 −0.487*** −0.050
Age spline, 18–21 years −0.014 0.180*** −0.020 −0.057**
Age spline, 22–40 years −0.009*** 0.006** −0.016*** 0.001
Age spline, 41+ years −0.016*** −0.003 −0.018*** −0.009**
Education spline, 0–12 years −0.007 −0.034** −0.001 −0.003
Education spline, 12+ years 0.066*** 0.088*** 0.021 0.029
Completed high school or GED 0.071** 0.203*** 0.062 −0.020
Completed college −0.049 −0.133 −0.224 0.048
Currently married 0.039 0.173*** 0.073 0.125**
Formerly married 0.057** 0.022 0.104*** 0.156***
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Number of children 0–2 −0.073*** −0.314*** 0.047 −0.134***
Number of children 3–5 −0.057** −0.337*** 0.026 −0.144***
Number of children 6–11 −0.042** −0.354*** 0.042 −0.122***
Number of children 12–14 −0.060** −0.270*** 0.042 −0.159***
Number of children 15–17 −0.027 −0.347*** 0.035 −0.192***
Number of adults 0.040 −0.069** 0.211*** −0.076**
County unemployment rate −0.015*** −0.001 −0.009 −0.005
County population density 0.012 −0.024*** 0.025** −0.027***
Border county 0.043** 0.007 0.088*** 0.039
Spell quarter (before 10/02) 2.650*** 0.249*** −0.066 0.140
Spell 6 months (after 10/02) 1.053*** 0.184 0.033 0.162
Spell year (before 10/02) −0.042 −0.196 0.627 0.049
Spell year (after 10/02) 1.502*** 0.360 0.351 −0.022
AE x spell quarter (bef. 10/02)a 0.411*** 0.695*** 0.187 0.064
AE x spell 6 mo. (after 10/02) 3.206*** 1.629*** 0.370 0.066
AE x spell year (before 10/02) −0.317*** −0.156 0.422** 0.061
AE x spell year (after 10/02) −0.534*** −0.391*** 0.275 0.010
NOTE: The columns report estimated marginal effects (in percentage terms) from a multinomial logit competing-risk hazard specifi cation 
of the probability of the listed type of food stamp exit.  In addition to the listed controls, the model includes controls for fi scal year and 
spell duration.  It was estimated with 256,406 monthly observations and had a log likelihood of −56,171.88. ** signifi cant at the 0.05 
level (two-tailed test); *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
a “AE” stands for “any earnings at the start of the certifi cation period.”
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.7  Results from Discrete-Time Competing-Risk Hazard Models of Food Stamp Exits for Specifi c Reasons: 









Benefi ts −0.123*** 0.047 −0.034 0.009
Reported earned income 0.019*** 0.071*** −0.047*** −0.013
Reported unearned income 0.003 0.087*** −0.019 −0.005
No income at start of spell 0.078** 0.067 0.438*** 0.270***
Any earnings start of cert. period −0.295*** −0.283*** −0.295*** −0.199***
UI earnings last quarter 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.012***
Avg. UI earnings last year −0.020*** −0.020*** −0.043*** 0.001
C.V. UI earnings last year 0.060 −0.226*** 0.013 0.262***
Max. UI earnings last year 0.009*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.001
No UI earnings last year −0.052 −0.310*** −0.168 0.695***
Female −0.163*** 0.031 −0.231** 0.045
Age spline, 18–21 years −0.084*** −0.014 −0.127** −0.021
Age spline, 22–40 years −0.018*** 0.008 −0.022*** −0.012**
Age spline, 41+ years −0.022*** −0.006 −0.043*** −0.018
Education spline, 0–12 years 0.007 −0.031 0.014 −0.025
Education spline, 12+ years 0.041 0.123*** −0.008 0.060
Completed high school or GED −0.009 0.278*** −0.006 0.113
Completed college 0.090 0.036 −0.609*** −0.065
Currently married 0.159*** 0.197*** 0.055 0.031
Formerly married 0.175*** −0.001 0.303*** 0.073
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Number of children 0–2 −0.199*** −0.315*** −0.017 −0.072
Number of children 3–5 −0.073** −0.395*** −0.052 −0.137**
Number of children 6–11 −0.070** −0.313*** −0.027 −0.071
Number of children 12–14 −0.010 −0.343*** −0.079 −0.091
Number of children 15–17 0.050 −0.373*** 0.040 −0.084
Number of adults 0.034 −0.043 0.156** 0.022
County unemployment rate −0.025*** 0.007 −0.017 −0.002
County population density 0.008 −0.018 0.014 −0.006
Border county −0.033 0.048 0.109** 0.074
Spell quarter (before 10/02) 4.845*** 0.373** −0.059 0.142
Spell 6 months (after 10/02) 1.422*** −0.113 0.056 0.281
Spell year (before 10/02) −0.191 −0.358 2.527 −0.665***
Spell year (after 10/02) 2.291** 0.353 1.897 −0.586**
AE x spell quarter (bef. 10/02)a 0.817*** 0.808*** 0.621*** 0.187
AE x spell 6 mo. (after 10/02) 6.769*** 2.725*** 0.258 0.194
AE x spell year (before 10/02) −0.329*** −0.280 0.003 −0.146
AE x spell year (after 10/02) −0.687*** −0.424*** 0.544 0.220
NOTE: The columns report estimated marginal effects (in percentage terms) from a multinomial logit competing-risk hazard specifi cation 
of the probability of the listed type of food stamp exit. In addition to the listed controls, the model includes controls for fi scal year and 
spell duration. It was estimated with 142,180 monthly observations and had a log likelihood of −40,012.18. ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level 
(two-tailed test); *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
a “AE” stands for “any earnings at the start of the certifi cation period.”
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Among the demographic results, households headed by females 
are less likely than households headed by males to exit food stamps 
for missed recertifi cations and information problems. Being older is 
also negatively associated with exits for missed recertifi cations and in-
formation problems. Being currently or formerly married is generally 
positively associated with different types of exits. The number of chil-
dren is most strongly associated with exits for income ineligibility and 
is hardly associated at all with exits for information problems. At the 
same time, the number of adults in the household is signifi cantly posi-
tively associated with exits for information problems, possibly refl ect-
ing problems documenting sources of income for multiple adults.
Not surprisingly, the indicators for recertifi cation intervals have 
their strongest association with exits for missed recertifi cations. The 
indicators are also signifi cantly associated with exits for income ineligi-
bility, which is consistent with some high incomes being detected dur-
ing the recertifi cation process. Fewer large or signifi cant coeffi cients 
for the recertifi cation indicators exist for the information and residual 
exit categories.
Analyses without controls for benefi ts and reported incomes. 
There are three analytical concerns with including month-by-month 
measures of benefi ts and reported incomes in the event-history models. 
The fi rst is that these amounts may be endogenous, even though they 
are measured roughly one month prior to the continuation or exit out-
come that we observe. A second, related concern for the two income 
variables is that they may be systematically and strategically misre-
ported, especially in the middle of certifi cation periods. A third concern 
is that the benefi t and reported income variables may be overcontrolling 
for economic circumstances and not allowing us to see the gross impact 
of the earnings history variables. To address these concerns we reesti-
mated all of the event history models, dropping the controls for benefi ts 
and reported earned and unearned incomes. The results for the covered-
earnings history (including the volatility measure), demographic, and 
recertifi cation interval variables were not substantially changed by this 
respecifi cation.
Competing-risk counterfactuals. One especially useful feature 
of the competing-risks framework is that it can be used to conduct a 
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counterfactual analysis of what else might have happened to a food 
stamp household if it had not terminated its participation for the stated 
reason. In particular, we can apply the estimated coeffi cients from the 
model to the observed characteristics of the cases and predict the prob-
abilities of each of the alternative reasons for exit. For example, we can 
examine cases of households that terminated for lapsed certifi cations 
and estimate the probabilities that the clients would have been found to 
be fi nancially ineligible, would have failed to furnish appropriate infor-
mation, or would have stopped receiving food stamps for some other 
reason. Similarly, we can examine the probabilities of different types 
of exits conditional on other circumstances. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 report 
distributions of conditional predicted probabilities along these lines.
The fi rst fi ve rows of each table report conditional predicted prob-
abilities of households letting their certifi cations lapse separately for ac-
tual households that either continued their spells, let their certifi cations 
lapse, were found to be fi nancially ineligible, failed to provide appro-
priate information, or left for some other reason. The second fi ve rows 
report similar conditional predicted probabilities of exiting for fi nancial 
eligibility reasons, the third fi ve rows report conditional probabilities of 
failing to provide appropriate information, and the last fi ve rows report 
conditional probabilities of leaving for other reasons. 
On average, households that left the Food Stamp Program for one 
reason were at increased risk of leaving for each of the other reasons. 
For example, households that let their certifi cations lapse faced a risk 
of being found to be ineligible that was nearly as high as the risk for the 
households that were actually found to be ineligible. Households that 
let their certifi cations lapse also faced a hazard of failing to provide ap-
propriate information that was nearly as high as that for households that 
actually left for this reason. 
Similarly, households that exited for fi nancial eligibility reasons si-
multaneously faced substantially elevated risks of missing their recer-
tifi cations and slightly elevated risks of failing to provide appropriate 
information or leaving for other reasons.
While the risks of all types of exits were relatively higher in the 
months that the households actually exited, the models predict that 
there also are still large probabilities of remaining in the program. For 
instance, among black households that let their certifi cations lapse, the 
average predicted hazard of leaving for recertifi cation reasons is only 
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Table 4.8  Predicted Hazard Probabilities of Specifi c FS Exits Conditioned 
on Observed Spell Transitions for Cases Headed by Blacks (%)
Percentile
Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Prob(miss recertifi cation)
Continued spell 2.20 0.11 0.25 0.54 1.42 7.27
Missed recertifi cation 11.72 1.06 4.98 10.79 17.26 23.41
Income/assets too high 6.87 0.21 0.57 1.71 12.14 20.29
Failed to provide info. 4.65 0.18 0.38 0.96 6.63 15.14
Other inelig./vol. exit 3.14 0.17 0.34 0.76 2.83 10.37
Prob(income/assets too high)
Continued spell 1.05 0.15 0.28 0.57 1.20 2.37
Missed recertifi cation 3.04 0.45 0.91 1.99 3.94 6.66
Income/assets too high 3.66 0.52 1.00 2.18 4.70 8.45
Failed to provide info. 1.49 0.20 0.36 0.76 1.69 3.42
Other inelig./vol. exit 1.29 0.18 0.32 0.64 1.37 2.95
Prob(fail to provide info.)
Continued spell 0.78 0.23 0.36 0.60 0.95 1.47
Missed recertifi cation 1.45 0.44 0.62 0.91 1.58 3.45
Income/assets too high 1.03 0.33 0.51 0.79 1.16 1.93
Failed to provide info. 1.47 0.43 0.67 1.06 1.72 3.12
Other inelig./vol. exit 1.04 0.32 0.52 0.82 1.27 1.91
Prob(other/voluntary exit)
Continued spell 0.53 0.16 0.26 0.43 0.70 1.05
Missed recertifi cation 0.63 0.25 0.37 0.53 0.79 1.12
Income/assets too high 0.57 0.20 0.32 0.48 0.72 1.02
Failed to provide info. 0.67 0.24 0.37 0.57 0.86 1.22
Other inelig./vol. exit 0.84 0.28 0.44 0.70 1.09 1.58
NOTE: The table reports means and percentile values of predicted probabilities that are 
computed using estimated coeffi cients from the discrete-time competing-risk models 
presented in Table 4.5, applied to observed characteristics from the study’s sample of 
South Carolina food stamp administrative records. The probabilities are computed 
conditional on the observed type of transition: either a continuation of a spell or an 
exit for the listed reason.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.9  Predicted Hazard Probabilities of Specifi c FS Exits Conditioned 
on Observed Spell Transitions for Cases Headed by Whites (%)
Mean
Percentile
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Prob(miss recertifi cation)
Continued spell 2.92 0.10 0.33 0.62 1.32 10.62
Missed recertifi cation 17.47 1.26 9.44 17.06 25.32 32.20
Income/assets too high 8.69 0.21 0.52 1.23 16.85 26.99
Failed to provide info. 5.64 0.19 0.43 0.88 8.30 20.18
Other inelig./vol. exit 3.87 0.25 0.43 0.78 2.28 14.56
Prob(income/assets too high)
Continued spell 1.11 0.21 0.38 0.70 1.33 2.40
Missed recertifi cation 2.87 0.57 1.04 2.06 3.83 6.34
Income/assets too high 2.95 0.58 0.98 1.89 3.94 6.91
Failed to provide info. 1.34 0.29 0.46 0.83 1.53 2.91
Other inelig./vol. exit 1.23 0.27 0.45 0.77 1.34 2.43
Prob(fail to provide info.)
Continued spell 1.22 0.33 0.58 0.98 1.56 2.36
Missed recertifi cation 1.94 0.60 0.90 1.41 2.38 4.09
Income/assets too high 1.40 0.45 0.70 1.09 1.69 2.63
Failed to provide info. 2.07 0.70 1.09 1.69 2.58 3.79
Other inelig./vol. exit 1.58 0.56 0.89 1.35 1.98 2.77
Prob(other/voluntary exit)
Continued spell 0.96 0.23 0.44 0.81 1.32 1.90
Missed recertifi cation 1.03 0.31 0.56 0.88 1.34 1.92
Income/assets too high 0.97 0.28 0.51 0.84 1.28 1.79
Failed to provide info. 1.22 0.34 0.63 1.05 1.65 2.34
Other inelig./vol. exit 1.45 0.52 0.86 1.33 1.90 2.59
NOTE: The table reports means and percentile values of predicted probabilities that are 
computed using estimated coeffi cients from the discrete-time competing-risk models 
presented in Table 4.6, applied to observed characteristics from the study’s sample of 
South Carolina food stamp administrative records. The probabilities are computed 
conditional on the observed type of transition: either a continuation of a spell or an 
exit for the listed reason. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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11.7 percent, the average predicted hazard of leaving for any other rea-
son is 5.1 percent, and the average predicted probability of continuing is 
83.2 percent. Among white households that let their certifi cations lapse, 
the corresponding estimates are 17.5, 5.8, and 76.3 percent. 
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have used electronic case records from South 
Carolina and event-history methods to examine the characteristics of 
households with children that are associated with faster exits from the 
Food Stamp Program. Our investigation is distinctive because it not 
only examines general exit behavior but also measures and analyzes 
specifi c programmatic reasons for exit, including exits for missed re-
certifi cations, income ineligibility, failure to provide suffi cient or re-
liable information, other types of ineligibility, and voluntary reasons. 
As such, the chapter adds to a growing body of research that carefully 
considers the impact of administrative features of assistance programs. 
Our analysis also includes controls for earnings histories, allowing us 
to examine how earnings volatility interacts with these administrative 
features.
A principal fi nding from the chapter is that households with chil-
dren in South Carolina are far more likely to leave the Food Stamp 
Program for administrative reasons of failing to submit their recerti-
fi cation paperwork and failing to provide suffi cient or reliable infor-
mation than for other eligibility reasons, including income eligibility. 
Half of the food stamp case terminations that we examined, involving 
nearly identical percentages for blacks and whites, occurred because 
households had let their certifi cation periods lapse. A further one-sixth 
of terminations, again with nearly identical percentages for blacks and 
whites, occurred when the households failed to provide information, 
failed to attend required interviews, or could not document their eco-
nomic circumstances. 
In contrast to the two-thirds of the exits that occurred for these pa-
perwork reasons, only about one-fi fth of exits occurred because house-
holds were formally determined to be ineligible on the basis of income 
or resources. A further 9 percent of exits occurred through some other 
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loss of eligibility, usually related to the household moving or the client 
being a nonresident, and about 3 percent of exits occurred voluntarily.
There are several potential explanations for why food stamp recipi-
ents might let their eligibilities lapse or run into paperwork problems, 
each with different implications for the well-being of exiting house-
holds. On the one hand, households with increases in income or re-
sources may realize that they are soon likely to be found ineligible and 
may therefore lose the incentive to complete paperwork. On the other 
hand, the documentation requirements for continued participation may 
be unduly burdensome in some circumstances, leading to a number of 
otherwise eligible households being dropped from the program. The 
documentation may be especially hard to provide when there is low-
wage employment, when there are many members of the household or 
changes in household composition, or when the members frequently 
change jobs.
We fi nd evidence for both types of explanations. In the descriptive 
analyses, the households that fail to recertify have better economic cir-
cumstances on average—higher and more stable incomes—than house-
holds that voluntarily withdraw or lose their eligibility for nonfi nancial 
reasons, and they have only slightly worse economic circumstances 
than households that are determined to be fi nancially ineligible. Results 
from the multivariate analysis further indicate that households that let 
their certifi cations lapse were facing relatively higher risks of leaving 
for fi nancial eligibility and other reasons. At the same time, the descrip-
tive analyses indicated that substantial proportions of the households 
that missed their recertifi cations were lacking fi nancial resources just 
before they exited. Also, households that failed to recertify were re-
ceiving an average of $224 to $255 in monthly benefi ts at the time of 
their exits, and predictions from the multivariate models revealed that 
there were high probabilities that they might have continued to receive 
benefi ts. 
Compared with households that miss their recertifi cations or lose 
eligibility for fi nancial reasons, the households that run into informa-
tion and documentation problems appear to be especially disadvan-
taged, suggesting that their unstable circumstances may be interfering 
with their ability to get needed assistance.
There is evidence that households respond to the incentives associ-
ated with higher food stamp benefi ts. Households with higher benefi ts 
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are signifi cantly less likely than other households to let their certifi ca-
tions lapse. Among black-headed households, higher benefi ts are also 
signifi cantly negatively associated with information failures.
One feature of South Carolina’s food stamp policy is that it requires 
households with earnings to recertify their eligibility more frequently 
than households with fi xed incomes. As one would expect, the length 
of the certifi cation period is strongly associated with food stamp exits. 
Besides the purely mechanical issue of whether there is a recertifi ca-
tion to miss, our multivariate analyses also indicate that recertifi cations 
lead to determinations of income ineligibility. The multivariate analy-
ses confi rm that households with earnings are more likely to leave for 
missed recertifi cations and for income ineligibility at shorter intervals 
than other households.
More variable earnings histories are also associated with food stamp 
exits, but in different ways for different types of exits. Among white-
headed households, more variable earnings are signifi cantly negatively 
related to exits for income ineligibility but positively related to exits in 
our “other” category. Among black-headed households, more volatile 
earnings are also signifi cantly positively related to exits in our residual 
category.
State policymakers face an unenviable (and as our research has 
shown consequential) trade-off in setting their food stamp recertifi ca-
tion policies. Shorter intervals improve program integrity; however, 
they also raise compliance costs and reduce participation among at 
least some otherwise eligible households. Simpler recertifi cation forms 
that only request information about changes in relevant circumstances 
might help to reduce the paperwork burden for families. State policy-
makers might also consider better coordination across public assistance 
programs and possibly even with the state tax departments. 
Notes
This chapter was originally prepared for the National Poverty Center and Economic Re-
search Service conference on “Income Volatility and Implications for Food Assistance 
Programs II,” November 16–17, 2006, in Washington, DC. It was also presented at the 
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Annual Research Conference, 
November 2–4, 2006, in Madison, Wisconsin, and the Southern Economic Association 
Annual Meetings, November 18–21, 2006, in Charleston, South Carolina. The authors 
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data, Sandy Allen and Julie Taylor for descriptions of South Carolina’s food stamp poli-
cies, and Molly Jacobs and Irene Valerio Navarette for research assistance. They also 
thank Dean Jolliffe, Tom Mroz, Lowell Taylor, and Jim Ziliak for helpful comments. 
The views expressed in this report are the authors’ own and do not necessarily refl ect 
those of the U.S. Department of Agriculture or the South Carolina Department of Social 
Services.
 1. In terms of federally defi ned resource limits, households may have $2,000 in 
countable resources, such as a bank account, and may have $3,000 if at least one 
person is aged 60 or older, or is disabled. Certain resources are not counted, such 
as a home and in some cases a vehicle. However, in April 2001, South Carolina 
opted to expand “categorical eligibility” under federal regulatory authority, which 
allows states to exclude consideration of assets if income is at or below 180 per-
cent of federal poverty guidelines and the household is receiving services from the 
state’s TANF program. 
 2. If the application is expedited for an emergency situation, the application must be 
dated within four days and benefi ts must be accessible by the seventh day.
 3. Procedures for households consisting entirely of elderly or disabled clients living 
on fi xed incomes are different. These households are certifi ed for two years but 
receive an interim contact annually. 
 4. In 1985, legislation was passed establishing the Food Stamp Employment and 
Training (E&T) program, designed to assist able-bodied recipients in gaining em-
ployment skills. Only about 10 percent of food stamp recipients were subject to 
these requirements. South Carolina obtained a statewide waiver to exempt able 
bodied adults without dependents from time limit provisions in March 2004. This 
made voluntary participation in the E&T program practical for food stamp re-
cipients. Although the program is no longer mandatory, more than 3,000 clients in 
South Carolina elected to participate in E&T activities in 2005.
 5. Some studies of welfare participation (e.g., Harris 1993) have distinguished among 
losses of eligibility for different reasons, and Moffi tt (2003) has recently examined 
nonfi nancial reasons for welfare exits.
 6. Food stamp households in South Carolina that miss their recertifi cations and have 
their cases closed have one month to submit their paperwork and have it treated as 
a recertifi cation. After a month, any paperwork is treated as a new application.
 7. Some of the differences in covered earnings at the time of exit are undoubtedly the 
result of clients in the residual cases moving out of state and in a few cases dying. 
However, evidence of disadvantage precedes the exits and is seen in other indica-
tors such as low levels of education and marriage.
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